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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 -TERM
INSURANCE
Failure Of Proper Notice To Insurer
In Deso v. London and Lancashire Indem. Co. of America,' a tenant brought
an action, pursuant to section 167 of the New York Insurance Law, against
landlord's insurer to recover the amount of a judgment which said tenant had
secured against the landlord in a personal injury action. In defense of this action
the insurance company maintained that the insured had failed to notify the
insurance company until 51 days after he learned of the injury, and therefore had
not fulfilled the requirement of the insurance policy that on the happening of an
occurrence insured must give written notice to insurer as soon as practicable.
This Court, reversing the lower courts, 2 held that the tenant's recovery against
the insurance company was barred in that the insured as a matter of law had
failed to comply with the terms of the liability policy.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that failure to satisfy the requirements
of an insurance policy, which provides on the happening of an occurrence written
notice shall be given to the insurer as soon as practicable, relieves the insurer of
liability.3 The term "as soon as practicable" will be construed to mean within a
reasonable time under all circumstances.4 In the absence of an excuse or other
mitigating circumstances, the question as to whether the timeliness of the notice
given was reasonable under the circumstances, so as to satisfy the requirement, is
a matter of law to be ascertained by the Court.5 Where mitigating circumstances
are offered as an excuse, the question as to whether the notice was given in a
reasonable time, becomes a question of fact to be decided by the jury. 6 In the
instant case the Court held that in the absence of mitigating circumstances the
lapse of 51 days, between the time the insured learned of the injury and when he
notified the insurer, constitutes a failure to fulfill this condition as a matter of law.
It is apparent that since the policy required written notice as soon as
practicable and no excuse was offered, the majority was correct in finding that
51 days was unreasonable as a matter of law. The position taken by the dissent,
that it should be a question for the jury regardless of whether mitigating circum7
stances are offered, seems to be unsupported by the decisions in this state.
1. 3 N.Y.2d 127, 164 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1957).
2. 2 A.D.2d 385, 157 N.Y.S.2d 682 (3rd Dep't 1956).
3. Coleman v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367
(1928).
4. Vanderbilt v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 265 App. Div. 495, 39
N.Y.S.2d 808 (2d Dep't 1943).
5. Rushing v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 302, 167 N.E. 450
(1929).
6. Gluck v. London and Lancashire Indem. Co., 2 N.Y.2d 953, 162 N.Y.S.2d
357 (1957).
7. Melcher v. Ocean Acc. and Guar. Corp., 226 N.Y. 51, 123 N.E. 81 (1919);
Bazar v. Great Amer. Indem. Co., 306 N.Y. 481, 119 N.E.2d 346 (1954).

